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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Randy L. Robinson,
Petitioner/Appellee,
Appeal No. 20100197-CA

v.
Alexander Earl Baggett,
Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal due to the absence of a final
and appealable order in this matter. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT
97, Tj 11, 37 P.3d 1070 (recognizing that Utah courts "have repeatedly affirmed the
viability of thefinaljudgment rule as a barrier to [appellate] jurisdiction"). In the event
this court determines that the trial court did enter a final and appealable order in this
matter, this court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4103(2)(h). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2009) (stating that the Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases").
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue I: The threshold issue presented is whether this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this appeal because, after entering the only final and appealable order in
this matter, the trial court determined that several legitimate issues remained to be
resolved and reopened the judgment so that the parties could continue to negotiate a final
order that accurately reflected the court's extensive rulings?

Standard of Review: "The determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law." Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 v. Utah
Transit Auth., 2004 UT App 310, ^f 6, 99 P.3d 379; see also Houghton v. Department of
Health, 2005 UT 63, ^ 16, 125 P.3d 860 ("[T]he issue of subject matter jurisdiction ;is a
threshold issue,5 which can be raised at any time and must be addressed before the merits
of other claims.").

Issue II: The sole substantive issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying Alexander Earl Baggett's rule 60(b) motion where either Robinson's
misrepresentation and misconduct or a clerical error resulted in the trial court entering an
alimony award for nearly three (3) years longer than the period for which the court
expressly announced it intended?

2

Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] reviewfs] a district court's denial of a
rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion." Jones v.
Lavton/Okland. 2009 UT 39, If 10, 214 P.3d 859.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following rules, statutes, and cases are determinative to this appeal and are
reproduced in their entirety in Addendum A to this brief:
•
•
•

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 60 cf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A trial was held in this divorce case on June 15 and 16, 2005. Approximately six

months later, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision disposing of all issues tried
before the court. The parties attempted to put this Memorandum Decision into a
complete and accurate final order for the next two-and-one-half years. Despite
continuously objecting to the proposed final orders as variously drafted during that time
by the petitioner, Randy L. Robinson, the respondent, Alexander Earl Baggett, failed to
timely object to the proposed final orders when ultimately submitted to the trial court.
Hearing no timely objection, the trial court entered Robinson's proposed orders on April
11, 2008. On April 28, 2008, Baggett filed a Motion for Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) Relief
(rule 59 motion), which motion was denied because the court determined that the
3

proceedings had not been irregular and that Baggett had not suffered from accident or
surprise. On July 10, 2008, Baggett filed a Motion for Rule 60 Relief From Judgment or
Order (rule 60(b) motion). At a hearing on this motion, the court identified several
legitimate issues that remained to be resolved and reopened this judgment, ordering the
parties to continue to negotiate the final order, noting that it intended to resolve these
issues at a hearing if the parties were unable to do so. After nearly fifteen (15) months of
negotiation proved unsuccessful, the parties submitted these remaining issues to the court
for resolution. Rather than hold a hearing to resolve these issues, the court, through a
different judge, purported to deny Baggett's rule 60(b) motion. In order to preserve his
rights, Baggett timely appealed on March 5, 2010.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The petitioner, Randy L. Robinson, a divorce attorney practicing in Utah, and the
respondent, Alexander Earl Baggett, a FedEx pilot now based in Tennessee, were married
in Utah on December 31, 1995. In March 2003, Robinson filed a Petition for Divorce
requesting, inter alia, that Baggett be ordered to pay to her "a reasonable sum of
alimony." R. 2. This matter was tried in front of the Honorable Stephen L. Roth in midJune 2005, at which time the proceedings were bifurcated. See R. 862-65. Final
arguments and briefing were presented to the court on June 29, 2005, and that same day
the court granted Robinson's request for a divorce from Baggett. See R. 872-75. Thus,
the parties' marriage lasted a total of 114 months.
4

Approximately six (6) months after the trial, on or about January 4, 2006, the trial
court, through Judge Roth, entered a Memorandum Decision explicitly detailing the
various rulings made at trial and attempting to resolve all the remaining issues in this
matter. See R. 913-49. As an initial matter, the court reiterated that the parties had been
divorced in June 2005 "by agreement of the parties." R. 913. The court then awarded
Robinson alimony of $1882 per month and ordered "[t]hat [this] sum is payable for a
period equal to the length of the marriage," or 114 months. R. 943. And in light of
Baggetf s failure to pay fully under the temporary orders, the court further concluded
that, although Baggett had paid more than two (2) years of temporary alimony, "it is
reasonable and equitable that only one year of the pre-trial period be counted as having
fulfilled [his] alimony obligation." Id. Consequently, the trial court awarded Robinson
alimony for a period of 114 months beginning in June 2004. See id. Finally, this
Memorandum Decision assigned Robinson's counsel to draft the resulting findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order. See R. 948.
For the next eight (8) months, the parties attempted to negotiate terms of proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order that accurately reflected the court's
rulings made at the June 2005 trial and detailed in the January 2006 Memorandum
Decision. When negotiations proved unsuccessful, the parties submitted their respective
1

As of that date—January 4, 2006—all of the substantive issues in this case had been
preliminarily addressed by the court. All litigation from January 4, 2006 through the
present has been directed toward clarifying the rulings made at the June 2005 trial and
detailed in the January 2006 memorandum decision and finalizing any issues only
preliminarily addressed therein.
5

positions to the court for a ruling on or about September 1, 2006. See R. 952-1016. It
was not until July 11, 2007—more than ten (10) months after the objection had been
submitted and nearly eighteen (18) months after the court had issued its Memorandum
Decision—that the court, again through Judge Roth, held a hearing for the purpose of
clarifying its several rulings that remained in dispute. See R. 1924.
At the July 2007 hearing, the court entertained argument on numerous disputed
issues, specifically including, but not limited to, the inclusion of appropriate amounts of
life insurance, the duration and commencement date of alimony, and the effective date
for purposes of the accompanying qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs). See
generally R. 1924. The court determined that "there should be some life insurance set to
be in place [to] guarantee some of these payments that are ongoing," but left it to the
parties to determine the parameters of this insurance because they will "know better
what's reasonable and what's doable in that sense." Id. at 16. As for the alimony
duration and commencement date, the court affirmed its earlier decision that Robinson
should be awarded alimony for a period of the term of the parties' marriage, or 114
months, with one year credit given for Baggett's payment of temporary alimony during
the period between the parties' separation and the entry of the parties' divorce. See id. at
33-34. The court made no rulings altering its earlier decision that alimony should begin
in June 2004 and, in fact, expressly rejected Robinson's suggestion that her alimony
award be extended beyond the statutory limits based on Baggett's alleged fault. See id.
at 42-43. Finally, the court ruled that, although the possible effective dates for purposes
6

of the accompanying QDROs "tend to be somewhat arbitrary," the effective date for the
divisions related to the QDROs will be "the date the supplemental decree was signed."
Id. at 27, 29.
Following this hearing, the parties agreed that this time Baggett's counsel would
make the first attempt to accurately and thoroughly memorialize the court's rulings.
Despite stipulating on the record at the July 2007 hearing to resolution of many of the
disputed issues and being ordered by the trial court with respect to several others,
Robinson rejected nearly all of Baggett's revisions to her earlier proposed pleadings and
the parties' negotiations continued. As time wore on, the parties realized that agreement
was not likely and decided it was best to submit their respective positions to the trial
court for a final decision.
On or about March 5, 2008, Robinson served Baggett with an Amended
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with an Amended
Supplemental Decree of Divorce (collectively the Orders). See R. 1375-78.
Accompanying the Orders was a signed certificate of service also dated March 5, 2008.
See id. Through counsel, Baggett immediately notified Robinson of his intention to
object through a letter dated March 12, 2008. See R. 1390-91. Robinson's counsel
responded, stating that he was "inclined to submit the [Orders] to the Court... [on] April
2, 200[8]." R. 1397. On April 2, Baggett's counsel contacted Robinson's counsel and
requested an extension, advising him that Baggett's objection would not be ready by the
arbitrarily-established deadline. See R. 1503. As alluded to, Robinson's counsel
7

submitted the Orders to the court on April 3, 2008.2 See id. After repeatedly objecting to
Robinson's interpretation of the court's rulings for nearly three (3) years and despite his
oft-expressed intent to continue to do so until final resolution by the court, Baggett
inadvertently failed to timely object to the Orders as drafted. The court, through the
Honorable Robert P. Faust, signed and entered the Orders on April 11, 2008/ See R.
1322-70.
The Alimony Provision in the April 11, 2008 Orders
The alimony provisions in the orders as entered on April 11, 2008, directly
contradict the court's alimony rulings as made at the June 2005 trial, detailed in the
January 2006 memorandum decision, and clarified at the July 2007 hearing. The trial
court undisputedly ruled that the parties' marriage lasted 114 months and that Baggett
should be given credit for one year of alimony paid after the parties' separation and
before the divorce was entered. See R. 943. Because the parties were divorced in June
2005 and Baggett was given credit for his payment of one-year of temporary alimony, the

It should be noted that Baggett's counsel received a copy of the letter from Robinson's
counsel to the court with the Orders enclosed on April 4, 2008. See R. 1384. However,
due to a move into his firm's new offices, which move occurred during the first two
weeks of April 2008, Baggett's counsel did not become aware of this letter until April 24,
2008, after he had first realized that the Orders had already been entered. See id.
3

Although the Honorable Stephen L. Roth had heard the several years of argument in this
matter and had made the underlying and clarifying rulings from which the final order was
allegedly derived, the Honorable Robert P. Faust signed this final order shortly after the
case was transferred to him. See R. 1502. As will be explained in more detail below,
this case was transferred to a third judge, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, at a later and
equally critical juncture in this litigation.
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court ordered Robinson's alimony award to begin in June 2004. Id. And because the
court expressly declined Robinson's invitation to consider fault in extending her alimony
award beyond the statutorily-presumed limits, see R. 1924, pgs. 41-43, Robinson's
alimony award was ordered to last for 114 months beginning in June 2004, 4 see id. at 3334. Aside from the above, the court made no further rulings with respect to Robinson's
alimony award. However, in the final orders drafted by Robinson, her alimony award
lasts for a period equal to the length of the parties' marriage beginning on the date of
entry of the final orders—April 11, 2008—providing her with an additional 34 months of
alimony. See R. 1328. In addition to directly contradicting the court's rulings, this
alimony award is unsupported by any factual findings sufficient to justify an award of
alimony for longer than the term of the parties' marriage, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(h) (2010), presumably because the court made no such findings.
Baggett's Motions for Relief From the April 11, 2008 Orders
Shortly after realizing that he had failed to properly object and that the April 11,
2008 Orders had been entered as drafted, Baggett's counsel filed a Motion for Rule 59(e)

4

By way of explanation, the parties alternately refer to the alimony award as lasting for
only 102 months, rather than the length of the parties' marriage at 114 months. See e.g.,
R. 1328. The reason for this is that the parties chose, for the sake of simplicity, to deduct
Baggett's ordered one-year credit from the total length of the marriage so that the
alimony commencement date can then properly be tied to the date the divorce was
entered. The alternative (which differs only in method) was to begin the alimony
payment, as the court ordered, in June 2004, one year prior to the date the parties' were
divorced, and continue the alimony obligation for 114 months. Under either approach,
Robinson is awarded alimony only through December 2013 (102 months from June 2005
or 114 months from June 2004). See R. 943.
9

or Rule 60(b) Relief (rule 59 motion). See R. 1371-82. Therein, Baggett argued
primarily that he was entitled to a new trial on the grounds that there were irregularities in
the proceedings or that he was caught by accident or surprise. See R. 1374-79; Utah R.
Civ. P. 59(a)(1), (a)(3). In the alternative, Baggett argued that he should be relieved from
the judgment on the basis of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); see R. 1379-80. The court denied Baggett's rule 59 motion
without a hearing, determining that Baggett's counsel's failure to object to the order as
drafted was inexcusable. See R. 1504; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The court further
determined that, "even assuming that [Baggett's rule 59] Motion is timely and
procedurally appropriate," he is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of accident or
surprise because, by April 4, 2008 at the latest, his counsel was on notice that the Orders
had been submitted to the court.5 R. 1504; see Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). Accordingly,
the court denied Baggett's rule 59 motion in its entirety. See id.
On July 10, 2008, Baggett filed a Motion for Rule 60 Relief From Judgment or
Order (the rule 60(b) motion), newly asserting that relief was warranted as a result of
either "fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party," satisfaction
of the judgment, or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
5

This statement makes clear that the trial court's ruling was aimed primarily at Baggett's
request for rule 59 relief, not at his alternative request for rule 60(b) relief: Although
Baggett's request for rule 59 relief was untimely by one day, see Utah R. Civ. P. 59(b)
(providing that such a request should be made within ten (10) days of entry of the order),
his alternative request for rule 60(b) relief was undoubtedly timely, see kL R. 60(b)
(requiring that such a request be made within three (3) months of the date the order is
entered).
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judgment." R. 1684-86; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (5)-(6). After reviewing this motion
and recognizing the full procedural posture of this litigation, the trial court, through Judge
Faust, held a hearing to resolve this rule 60(b) motion on October 23, 2008. See R. 1923
(transcript from the hearing). At this hearing, Judge Faust readily identified several
"legitimate" issues that remained unresolved and recognized the need for further court
ruling absent agreement of the parties. See idL at 6:12-22. The court stated that it desired
to "simply handle the threshold issue of whether or not to grant [Baggett's rule 60(b)]
motion ... [and] ask[] both [parties] to go back one last time and get the order completely
consistent with what Judge Roth had asked [to be done]." Id at 5:17-24. The court then
stated that if the parties were unable to agree on the final wording necessary to implement
any of Judge Roth's rulings, the court intended to rule on each issue and "sanction
somebody for whoever was wrong." Id. at 5:24-6:11. In other words, although the court
was willing to rule immediately on the substantive issues still in dispute, it first "want[ed]
to give [the parties] a chance to rethink [their respective] positions," id. at 9:1-7.
Following a brief recess off the record, Robinson's counsel conceded that all of
the issues raised "probably ought to ... be heard," and further informed the court that the
parties "ha[d] agreed t[o] ... meet... next week sometime ... and for a few minutes right
now." Id. at 10:1-6. The court immediately inquired whether the purpose of the
meetings was "To see if [the parties] can get a final order?" To this, Robinson's counsel
responded "Oh, yes." The court replied "All right," and Robinson's counsel thanked the
court for providing direction on the remaining issues. Id. at 10:7-14. Robinson's
ll

counsel then reaffirmed with the court that "the main issues we've got... would be the
alimony issue duration and commencement date, and then this issue of offset and
arrearages, and then life insurance. And the Court... has at least acknowledged that...
th[e] life insurance issue ... i[s] a bona fide issue." Id. at 11:14-22. The court then
reiterated that the life insurance issue was "legitimate" and would likely "need some
additional clarification" from the court. Id. at 11:23-25. When the court later asked
whether it "[s]hould ... set another date" for a hearing to resolve these disputed issues,
Robinson's counsel resisted, recommending instead that the parties first attempt to
resolve the disputed issues without additional court assistance and then, if necessary, the
court could schedule another hearing. Id. at 13:5-12.
Having agreed to the reopening of this otherwise final judgment, the parties
attempted to negotiate final resolution of these still-disputed issues for an additional
fifteen (15) months with no success. In an effort to bring these still-disputed issues back
to the court's attention and to secure the hearing necessary to finally resolve this case, as
explicitly anticipated by Judge Faust at the October 2008 hearing, Baggett filed a Request
to Submit for Decision (Hearing Requested) on January 25, 2010. See R. 1911-13. By
order dated February 4, 2010, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, apparently unaware that
Judge Faust had already granted Baggett's rule 60(b) motion at the October 2008 hearing,
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purported to deny Baggett's rule 60(b) motion without ever holding a hearing to resolve
these still-disputed issues.6 See R. 1914-17. This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court
has not yet entered a final and appealable order from which this appeal may properly be
taken. Although the trial court entered a final order on April 11, 2008, the trial court later
granted Baggett relief from this order, reopening the litigation for the express purpose of
allowing the parties to attempt to resolve the several legitimate issues the court identified
as still in dispute. The parties were unable to resolve these issues on their own and
ultimately submitted these issues to the trial court for final resolution. Rather than
resolve these issues, however, the trial court, through a different judge who was
apparently unaware of the full procedural posture of this litigation, purported to deny
Baggett5 s rule 60(b) motion even though it had already been granted by the previous
judge. In doing so, the trial court made no rulings necessary to resolve these stilldisputed issues nor undertook any other action to provide the finality that the earlier
judge had determined was lacking. Because the trial court still has not entered a final
order since reopening the April 11, 2008 order, this court lacks jurisdiction over this

6

Of note, this was Judge Maughan's first and only involvement in the nearly seven (7)
years of litigation in this case, and his ruling made no mention of the October 2008
hearing or Judge Faust's rulings therein. See R. 1914-17.
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appeal and must dismiss it without prejudice to the timely filing of a notice of appeal
following entry of a final judgment or order in this matter.
Even if this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Baggetf s rule 60(b) motion because the alimony award does not
conform to the court's substantive alimony rulings. The trial court explicitly ruled that
Robinson should receive alimony for a period of 114 months starting in June 2004.
Under the order as drafted by Robinson and entered by the trial court, however, Robinson
inexplicably receives alimony for a period of approximately 148 months. This erroneous
award was entered either as a result of Robinson's misrepresentation and other
misconduct or as the result of a clerical error. In either case, an examination of the
applicable legal principles in light of all the relevant circumstances of this litigation lead
to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in not relieving Baggett from
the alimony award as entered. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Baggett's motion
for rule 60(b) relief should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Appeal Because the
Trial Court Has Not Entered a Final and Appealable Order Since
Recognizing That Legitimate Issues Remained to Be Resolved and
Reopening the Matter to Allow the Parties to Negotiate the Final Order.
This court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court has yet to enter
a final and appealable order in this matter. Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure states that an appeal may only be taken "from ... final orders and judgments,
14

except as otherwise provided by law." Utah R. App. P. 3(a). "For an order or judgment
to be final, it must ... dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the
case. In other words, a judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties
litigant." Bradbury v. Valencia. 2000 UT 50,%9, 5 P.3d 649 (emphasis, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted). This final judgment rule "prevents a party from
prematurely appealing a non-final judgment," and Utah courts "have repeatedly affirmed
the viability of the final judgment rule as a barrier to [appellate] jurisdiction." Loffredo
v. Holt 2001 UT 97, If 11, 37 P.3d 1070. It is also well established that a "lack of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when subject matter [jurisdiction] does
not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that void." Barton v.
Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ^ 12, 29 P.3d 13 (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original).
In this case, there is no final judgment or order from which an appeal can properly
be taken. Although Judge Roth presided over the vast majority of the litigation in this
case, Judge Faust signed and entered an order in this case on April 11, 2008. See R.
1322-70. Baggett timely filed a rule 60(b) motion requesting relief from several
provisions of this judgment, specifically including the life insurance requirements, the
alimony duration and commencement date, and the issue of offset and arrearages. See
generally R. 1510-1686. As supporting grounds, Baggett asserted that either Robinson's
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misrepresentation and misconduct or a clerical error resulted in entry of a final order that
does not conform to the trial court's substantive rulings. See R. 1684-86.
The court held a hearing to resolve Baggett's rule 60(b) motion on October 23,
2008. See R. 1923. After being presented with a full recitation of the background facts
and the relevant procedural history, the district court, again through Judge Faust,
reopened this judgment at the October 2008 hearing for the express purpose of allowing
the parties to negotiate the wording of a final order that was "completely consistent with
what Judge Roth had [earlier ruled]." R. 1923, pg. 5. In reopening the judgment, Judge
Faust expressly stated that the controversy between the parties was ongoing because there
were several "legitimate" issues with respect to which the court needed to make
additional rulings and/or provide further clarification. Id. at 11. In particular, the court
recognized that the following issues were (and are) still in dispute: "the alimony issue
duration and commencement date, ... th[e] issue of offset and arrearages, and the[ issue
of] life insurance." Id. Although the court was willing to rule on these remaining
substantive issues at the October 2008 hearing, it decided to give each party a chance to
reevaluate his or her respective positions before doing so. See id. at 9. The parties and
the court thus agreed that the parties were going to continue to negotiate "[t]o see if
[they] c[ould] get a final order," id. at 10, and "hopefully ... hammer out a final
document for [the court]," id. at 15. Mindful of the likelihood that the parties would be
unable to agree on these issues, Judge Faust then attempted to set a hearing for resolution
of these still-disputed issues, indicating that, at that hearing, he intended to sanction
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whichever party was on the losing side of each particular issue. See id. at 5-6,13.
Robinson's counsel resisted setting a date for this hearing, affirmatively representing to
the court that the parties would set a hearing date at a later time if and when the parties'
negotiations proved unsuccessful. See id. at 13.
For roughly fifteen (15) months after the court reopened this matter, the parties
negotiated these still-disputed issues and attempted to reach an agreement as to a final
order that is fully consistent with Judge Roth's underlying rulings. Ultimately unable to
resolve the remaining disputed issues on their own, the parties submitted the issues to the
court for resolution, sanction, and adoption of a final order, as anticipated by Judge Faust
at the October 2008 hearing.
For reasons that are not readily evident from the record on appeal, the presiding
judge of the third district court assigned a third judge, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, to
ultimately rule on these still-disputed issues. This assignment represented Judge
Maughan's first and only involvement in the nearly seven (7) years of this complex and
contentious litigation. Apparently unaware of the full procedural posture of this
litigation, Judge Maughan did not make any of the rulings Judge Faust had determined to
be necessary, nor did he even mention these still-disputed issues earlier identified by
Judge Faust. See R. 1914-17. In fact, Judge Maughan failed to hold the hearing
expressly contemplated by Judge Faust for the purpose of resolving these issues and his
ruling is altogether silent as to the occurrence of the October 2008 hearing or the rulings
made therein that legitimate issues were still in dispute. See id. Instead, Judge Maughan
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purported to deny Baggett's rule 60(b) motion without a hearing, stating that he believed
Baggett's rule 60(b) motion to be nothing more than a renewal of his earlier rule 59
motion, which motion Judge Faust had denied in July 2008, some three months prior to
holding the October 2008 hearing. See R. 1914-17. In so ruling, Judge Maughan
inadvertently failed to recognize that Baggett's rule 60(b) motion was no longer properly
before the court due to the absence of a final judgment from which he needed relief; the
court had already granted Baggett's requested relief by identifying several disputed issues
that remained to be addressed and reopening the judgment.
To be clear, since reopening the judgment at the October 2008 hearing, the trial
court has not held a hearing to resolve the issues Judge Faust identified as still in dispute,
made a ruling on these still-disputed issues, nor otherwise entered a final judgment or
order. In other words, the rulings necessary to bring finality to this case have still not
been made. And in light of the fact that the court made no mention of the still-disputed
issues in its denial of Baggett's rule 60(b) motion, this denial in and of itself cannot be
considered a final order because it did not "end[] the controversy between the parties
litigant." See Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, U 9, 5 P.3d 649. Moreover, even
assuming for argument's sake that Baggett's Request to Submit for Decision (Hearing
Requested) somehow led the trial court into mistakenly believing that his rule 60(b)
motion was still pending, this does not and cannot cure the jurisdictional defect in this
case. See Barton v. Barton. 2001 UT App 199, ^ 12, 29 P.3d 13. In sum, because the
trial court reopened this litigation at the October 2008 hearing for the negotiation and
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resolution of disputed issues, and the district court has since neither ruled on the disputed
issues nor entered a final judgment or order, there remains no final judgment or order
from which this appeal may be taken and this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.7
See Young v. Juber, 2007 UT App 171U, para. 3 (mem.) (per curiam) (disposing of an
appeal summarily because the order from which the appeal was taken had the effect of
"reopen[ingj the litigation between the parties").
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying Raggett's Motion for Rule
60 Relief From Judgment Or Order Because Either (A) Robinson's
Misrepresentation and Other Misconduct or (B) a Clerical Error Resulted
in Entry of an Alimony Award That Does Not Conform to the Court's
Substantive Alimony Rulings.
Pertinent to the present appeal, rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a trial court, "in the furtherance of justice[, to] relieve a party ... from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for ... (3) fraud ..., misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.'5 Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although a trial court is granted discretion to decide a
rule 60(b) motion, it must exercise this discretion "based on sound legal principles in
light of all relevant circumstances." Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304,
1306 (Utah 1982). The primary legal principle of which a trial court must be mindful
7

Respondent notes that this appeal does not otherwise qualify under an exception to the
final judgment rule, because no statute provides for an appeal in these circumstances, this
court has not granted interlocutory appeal pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and the district court did not expressly certify a judgment or order
in this case as final pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ^ 12, 5 P.3d 649 (listing the above as the only three
exceptions to the final judgment rule).
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involves a balancing between the competing "concerns that final judgments should not be
lightly disturbed and that unjust judgments should not be allowed to stand." IdL
In denying Baggett5s rule 60(b) motion the court failed to consider all the relevant
circumstances or balance the above-stated legal principles. As stated above, Judge
Maughan ruled on Baggett's rule 60(b) motion without a hearing, and this ruling was his
first involvement in the nearly seven (7) years of this litigation.8 Judge Maughan denied
Baggett's rule 60(b) motion "on both procedural and substantive grounds," R.1916, but a
close examination of his ruling demonstrates that neither was proper.
Judge Maughan begins by surmising that Baggett's rule 60(b) motion was
procedurally barred because he considered it to be "effectively a renewal by [Baggett] of
his prior [rule 59] motion" wherein Baggett sought, in the alternative, relief on the basis
of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." See R. 1371-73; Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(1). Despite this assertion, Judge Maughan then expressly acknowledges that
Baggett's rule 60(b) motion raised completely different grounds for relief from those
asserted in his earlier rule 59 motion: "[Baggett's rule 60(b)] Motion is based not on
excusable neglect, but rather that the Amended Decree did not accurately reflect the
Court's (through Judge Roth) substantive rulings." R. 1914-15; See id R. 60(b)(6).
Judge Maughan then succinctly concludes that, even though Baggett's rule 60(b) motion

o

It should be noted that, although the individual judges are referred to by name rather
than as "the court," this is done solely for the sake of clarity about the procedural history
that led to the unjust results in this case and is in no way intended to impugn any of the
individual judge's ability or character.
20

asserts different grounds for relief, his motion is procedurally barred because "there is
nothing in [Baggett's rule 60(b)] Motion which could not have been raised in his [earlier]
motion." R. 1915. Judge Maughan cites no legal authority to support this conclusion,
and this conclusion is not supported by the text of rule 60(b). In fact, the text of rule
60(b) directly implies that multiple rule 60(b) motions for relief may be filed. See id, R.
60(b) (containing different time frames for filing a motion under subsections (1) through
(3) than those for filing a motion under subsections (4) through (6)).
Judge Maughan also denied Baggett's rule 60(b) motion on substantive grounds,
stating that he "[wa]s not persuaded by [Baggett]'s argument that the Amended Decree
does not accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive rulings." R. 1915. As support, Judge
Maughan noted that he believed "this conclusion [to] comport[] with Judge Faust's
Minute Entry which similarly found a lack of legal or factual support for [Baggett's rule
59] Motion." R. 1915 n.l (emphasis in original). This reading of the import of Judge
Faust's rule 59 ruling is misplaced because it fails to recognize that, although Judge Faust
denied Baggett's rule 59 motion without a hearing, he considered Baggett's rule 60(b)
motion to warrant both a hearing and further court intervention. See generally R. 1923.
Notably, Judge Maughan's Minute Entry is altogether silent as to Judge Faust's
consideration of Baggett's rule 60(b) motion at the October 2008 hearing and his
identification at that hearing of several "legitimate" issues that remained to be resolved
by the court. See R. 1914-16. In fact, at the October 2008 hearing Judge Faust clearly
indicated that, contrary to Judge Maughan's assertion, he was persuaded that the final
21

orders failed to comport with Judge Roth's extensive rulings. See R. 1923, pg. 5 (asking
the parties "to go back one last time and get the order completely consistent with
what Judge Roth had [ruled]").
It is also noteworthy that Judge Maughan's decision appears to have been
informed by an unsupported and unnecessarily narrow view of the purpose of rule 60(b).
Judge Maughan noted that Baggett had ample time to file an objection to the form of the
Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce and simply failed to do so. See R. 1915. He
then concluded that, "having failed to timely file an Objection, [Baggett] cannot
circumvent that process by instead seeking relief under the auspices of rule 60(b)." Id.
However, this is exactly one of the stated purposes of rule 60(b). By its express terms,
rule 60(b) allows a court, "in the furtherance of justice[, to] relieve a party ... from a final
judgmentf or] order ... [that is entered as a result of] mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). And Utah case law makes clear that relief
is available so long as these grounds are aimed at "circumstances which ... befall counsel
or parties." Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, ^ 12, 104 P.3d 1198. It would be illogical to
conclude, as does Judge Maughan, that a party could not use rule 60(b) to seek relief
from a judgment that was entered as a result of the party's mistake or neglect. Whether
rule 60(b) relief is warranted under the asserted facts is another question.
Consequently, Judge Maughan failed to properly consider the relevant
circumstances and the applicable legal principles in denying Baggett5s rule 60(b) motion.
After proper examination of all the relevant circumstances in this litigation and
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consideration of the above-stated legal principles, it becomes evident that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Baggett's rule 60(b) motion because either (A)
Robinson's misrepresentation and other misconduct or (B) a clerical error resulted in
entry of an alimony award duration and commencement date that do not conform to the
court's substantive rulings and are not supported by adequate factual findings. Each of
these will be addressed individually below.
A. Robinson's Misrepresentation or Other Misconduct Led the Trial Court Into
Entering an Erroneous and Unjust Alimony Award that is Inconsistent With the
Trial Court's Substantive Rulings.
Robinson had full knowledge of the trial court's substantive alimony rulings and
repeatedly misrepresented those rulings to the court such that her alimony award was
unjustly extended by nearly three (3) years. As stated above, rule 60(b) allows a court to
relieve a party from a judgment or order that was entered as a result of "fraud ...,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Because these three bases for relief are listed in the disjunctive, a successful showing of
any one entitles the requesting party to relief.9 See id. Misrepresentation is not
statutorily defined, but is generally defined as "an assertion that does not accord with the
facts," often made "with the intent to deceive." Black's Law Dictionary, 1016 (7th ed.

9

For the sake of brevity, Baggett does not separately argue that Robinson engaged in
"other misconduct" justifying rule 60(b) relief from the Amended Supplemental Decree
of Divorce. Rather, Baggett presents a compelling argument regarding misrepresentation
and, in doing so, provides the court with all of the necessary information for a
determination, if the court is so inclined, that Robinson engaged in the less egregious
."other misconduct" justifying relief.
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1999). Utah case law clarifies, however, that "the outright intent to deceive is no longer
required in all cases" where misrepresentation is at issue; rather, it is simply "required
that [the allegedly misrepresenting party] have at least some knowledge or awareness of
her misstatement." Derbridge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 794 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998); see also id. at 795 n.6 (discussing in detail the distinctions between
misrepresentations made with the intent to defraud, knowing misrepresentations, and
innocent misstatements).
Just six months after the trial in this matter, the trial court filed a Memorandum
Decision carefully detailing its extensive rulings made at the trial, including explicit and
direct rulings regarding the alimony awarded to Robinson. See R. 913-49. The court
began by reiterating that this case had been bifurcated and the parties divorced in June
2005, further noting that "the matters resolved there will not be further addressed here."
R. 913. This decision to bifurcate and enter the divorce in June 2005 was done "by
agreement of the parties." Id. The court further ruled that Robinson should be awarded
alimony "for a period equal to the length of the [parties5] marriage," which is
undisputedly 114 months—from December 1995 through June 2005. Id. at 943.
Robinson received temporary alimony for slightly more than two (2) years between the
filing of the petition and the entry of the parties' divorce in June 2005. Because of
Baggett's failures to make some payments under the temporary orders, however, the
court ruled that Baggett should receive credit for his payment of only one year worth of
temporary alimony, such that his alimony obligation would begin in June 2004. See id.
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In addition, the court gave Baggett the opportunity to receive credit for his payment of
the additional year worth of temporary alimony such that his "period of alimony payment
will begin with June 2003." Id. However, Baggett was subsequently unable to take
advantage of this opportunity. Thus, his alimony obligation is, by order of the court, to
begin in June 2004 and last for a period of 114 months.10 See id.
Despite this unequivocal ruling, Robinson repeatedly drafted proposed orders that
substantively misstated the court's alimony ruling based on her belief that the trial court
had not adequately accounted for Baggett5 s fault. In her earliest iteration of the proposed
orders, Robinson ignored the one year of temporary alimony payments with which
Baggett was credited, insisting simply that alimony was to last for 114 months. See R.
957. Following months of formal and informal objections by Baggett regarding this oneyear credit, Robinson corrected this misstatement just prior to the July 2007 hearing. See
R. 1924, pgs. 33-34. Robinson then "proposed" that, as a result of Baggett's fault, the
court had intended to include in the January 2006 Memorandum Decision latfguage
altering the standard alimony termination triggers such that her alimony would continue
past her cohabitation or remarriage. See R. 1062. As support for this proposal, Robinson
asserted that she included these non-termination provisions to "comport with the [court's]
directive ... to include other necessary and customary provisions." Id. Ironically, what
her proposal actually did was eliminate all of the "necessary and customary" alimony

10

See footnote 4 supra.
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termination provisions. Indeed, the court rejected this "proposal" out of hand, reiterating
that it had purposely "limited the effects of [fault] to [the issues of equitable allocation of
marital assets and unsecured debt], and ... made a conscious decision" not to incorporate
fault into the alimony ruling. R. 1924, pgs. 42-43.
After all this, Robinson ultimately presented to the court an order awarding herself
alimony "for a period equal to the length of the marriage ... beginning with the date the
[Amended] Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered."11 R. 1328 (emphasis added).
Her stated justification for this significant extension was simply Baggett's fault. See R.
1702 (stating simply that "the Court f[ou]nd[] extensive dissipation of the marital
estate by [Baggett]"). In support, Robinson pointed to isolated language from the July
2007 hearing where the court clarified that the "divisions of my decision will take effect
as of the date the supplemental decree was signed." Id.; see R. 1924, pg. 29. In doing
so, however, Robinson pays no attention to the fact that this clarification came in
response to her counsel's request for the court to determine the division of retirement
accounts and "the effective date for purposes of the QDRO[s]." R. 1924, pg. 23. She
also ignores the court's unequivocal statement, made approximately twenty (20) minutes
later when the court was actually considering fault and alimony, that it "made a conscious
decision" not to incorporate fault into Robinson's alimony award. IcL at 42-43.

11

As the record makes clear, by the time this document was entered by the court it had
been re-titled "Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce." R. 1322 (emphasis added).
No "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" was entered in this case.
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As stated earlier, although Baggett repeatedly and strenuously objected to
Robinson's erroneous and ever-evolving alimony award in excess of the court's actual
alimony ruling, he inadvertently failed to timely object when the order was ultimately
submitted to the court and the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce, as drafted by
Robinson, was entered on April 11, 2008. See R. 1332. Under Robinson's Amended
Supplemental Decree of Divorce as entered by the court she receives alimony for 34
months longer—or nearly 30% longer—than the period of the parties' marriage. See id.
Robinson obviously misstated the court's alimony ruling, and she did so with "at
least some knowledge of her misstatement." See Derbridge, 963 P.2d at 794. To be
clear, Robinson has been a practicing divorce attorney in Utah for nearly 20 years. See
R. 918. As a seasoned divorce practitioner, and as demonstrated in her pleadings in this
case, see R. 1698-1702, Robinson had at least some knowledge of the elementary family
law code provision contained in Utah Code section 30-3-5, which provides that
"[ajlimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless ... the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) (2010).
At no point in the nearly seven (7) years of this litigation has the court made any findings
of "extenuating circumstances" sufficient to justify extension of the alimony award, and
the court has expressly rejected Robinson's various attempts to incorporate fault into the
alimony award. See generally R. 913-49; R. 1924, pgs. 42-43. It should also be noted
that neither the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce nor the accompanying
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Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contain any factual
findings to support the three-year extension of Robinson's alimony award. See R. 132270.
More to the point, Robinson unquestionably had foil knowledge of the trial court's
Memorandum Decision as of the date it was entered. As demonstrated above, this
Memorandum Decision explicitly awards alimony for a period of 114 months from June
2004. See id. at 943. With this knowledge alone, Robinson's unrelenting suggestion that
the court actually intended to award her alimony for a longer period of time, up to her
ultimate assertion of 148 months, is a clear misrepresentation because it in no way
"accord[s] with the facts."12 See Black's Law Dictionary, 1016 (7th ed. 1999).
Robinson's persistent and ever-evolving misrepresentation directly led the trial court into
entering an unjust order that cannot be allowed to stand. See Laub v. South Cent. Utah
Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982). The trial court's failure to grant Baggett's
request for rule 60(b) relief from this unjust order is an abuse of the trial court's
discretion and should be reversed.

This misrepresentation may also be enough to constitute fraud because Robinson's
"intent to deceive" can be inferred from the clear alimony ruling by the court, the lack of
any clarifying ruling by the court, and Robinson's level of sophistication in the family
law arena. Regardless, a showing of fraud is not necessary because rule 60(b) lists
"fraud," "misrepresentation," and "other misconduct" in the disjunctive such that proof of
one is all that is necessary for a party to secure relief. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
Along the same vein, even if the court is not convinced that Robinson's misstatement
rises to the level of a "misrepresentation," it clearly rises to the level of "other
misconduct" and justifies rule 60(b) relief. Id.
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B. In the Alternative, a Clerical Error Resulted in the Entry of an Alimony Award
that Does Not Conform to the Trial Court's Substantive Rulings.
As demonstrated in section 11(A) above, the alimony award entered by the court is
significantly and unjustifiably different than the alimony award as announced by the
court in its January 2006 Memorandum Decision. In the event this court determines that
this inaccuracy was not a result of Robinson's unrelenting misrepresentation or other
misconduct, this inaccuracy constitutes a clerical error subject to correction by this court
such that the alimony award conforms to the trial court's substantive rulings.
Subsection (6) of rule 60(b) provides that a party may be relieved from a judgment
or order if the party can demonstrate "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). "As the residuary clause of rule
60(b), subsection ([6]) embodies three requirements for relief: 'First, that the reason be
one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through ([5]); second, that the reason
justify relief; and third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time."'

Lincoln

Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Props., 838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982)).
Each of these three requirements is met in this case.
First, the correction of a clerical error is not one of the grounds listed in rule 60(b).
See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although the correction of a clerical error is expressly
13

At the time Lincoln Benefit was decided, rule 60(b) contained seven (7) subsections
and subsection (7) was the residuary clause. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1982). In 1998,
rule 60(b) was amended to delete as grounds one of these subsections, such that
subsection (6) is now the residuary clause. See i d (2009) (advisory comm. notes).
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contemplated in subdivision (a) of rule 60, it is excluded from subsections (1) through (5)
of rule 60(b). See id. R. 60(a), (b). In Kunzler v. O'Dell 855 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), this court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Kunzler was entitled to relief
from a judgment under the residuary clause of rule 60(b). See id. at 274. In doing so, the
Kunzler court concluded that "[s]ubsections one through [five of rule 60(b)] d[id] not
apply" because the trial court was simply faced with a request to correct a clerical error in
the judgment's description of the boundaries of real property so as to conform the
judgment to the court's substantive rulings. Id. The Kunzler court noted that "the [trial]
court thought it was entering a judgment factually consistent with its legal ruling" and
that, in correcting the judgment, the trial court's "legal ruling remained intact" even
though "the memorialization of it in the judgment no longer was." Id. at 274-75.
Baggett's rule 60(b) motion made the same argument, that the trial court's alimony award
is correct but was simply memorialized incorrectly. Because Baggett's rule 60(b) motion
simply seeks correction of this clerical error, subdivisions (1) through (5) do not apply.
Second, Baggett's requested relief is warranted because the trial court clearly
intended to award Robinson alimony for a period equal to the length of the parties'
marriage and not correcting the order would amount to an approximately $70,000
windfall for Robinson. The Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce awards Robinson
alimony for a period 34 months longer than the term of the parties' marriage, for a total
of 148 months. See R. 1328. However, this extended alimony award is directly contrary
to the court's intended ruling. The court's January 2006 Memorandum Decision
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expressly awards Robinson alimony "for a period equal to the length of the [parties']
marriage." R. 943. The court also noted that the parties were divorced in June 2005 and
that Baggett should be entitled to credit for his payment of one year of temporary
alimony, such that his alimony obligation begins in June 2004. See R. 913, 943.
Accordingly, the court's clear intent was that Robinson would receive alimony for 114
months from June 2004.
This intent is further supported by the findings and rulings the court did not make.
The Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted with the
Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce contains no findings of "extenuating
circumstances" sufficient to justify this extended alimony award. See R. 1336-70; Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) (2010) ("Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer
than the number of years that the marriage existed unless ... the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time."). And at
the July 2007 hearing to clarify the January 2006 Memorandum Decision, the court
expressly rejected Robinson's suggestion that the period of alimony be extended beyond
the statutory limits based on Baggett's alleged fault, stating that it believed fault to have
been adequately addressed in the property and debt distribution. R. 1924, pgs. 42-43.
Because the trial court expressly limited the period of alimony to the term of the parties'
marriage, made no factual findings to support an extension of that period, and expressly
rejected Robinson's request to do so, the only logical conclusion is that the court
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intended, as it clearly stated, to limit Robinson's alimony award to "a period equal to the
length of the [parties'] marriage." R. 943.
Finally, Baggett's rule 60(b) motion, filed less than 3 months after entry of the
offending order, was filed within a reasonable time. Utah case law makes clear that a
clerical error in a court's order can be corrected at any time, even after a Utah appellate
court has affirmed the viability of the offending order. See Bagnall v. Suburbia Land
Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978). And rule 60(b) directly implies that all rule 60 motions
are timely if filed "not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The trial court entered the erroneous order on
April 11, 2008. See R. 1332. Baggett filed his rule 60(b) motion on M y 10, 2008, less
than 3 months after entry of the offending order. See R. 1684. Thus, even applying the
stricter 3-month limitations period Baggett's rule 60(b) motion was filed within a
reasonable time.
Because Baggett's rule 60(b) motion was filed within a reasonable time and
asserted a valid ground for relief not contained in subsections (1) through (5) of rule
60(b), he was entitled to relief from the court's alimony ruling. See Lincoln Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Props.. 838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly,
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Baggett's rule 60(b) motion. Given the
express ruling by the trial court as to the alimony award duration and commencement
date, this court may correct this clerical error to conform the trial court's memorialization
of Robinson's alimony award to its substantive rulings. See Utah R. App. P. 30(a) ("The
32

court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or judgment
appealed from."). In the alternative, this court should remand this matter to the trial court
for correction of the erroneous alimony award.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Baggett respectfully requests that this court dismiss his
appeal without prejudice to the timely filing of a notice of appeal following entry of a
final judgment or order in this matter. In the alternative, Baggett respectfully requests
that this court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion for Rule 60 Relief from
Judgment or Order as an abuse of the trial court's discretion, and either (1) enter an
alimony award for no longer than the established statutory limit of the length of the
marriage, based on the court's unequivocal ruling and the adequate record before this
court, or (2) remand to the trial court for such other proceedings as are necessary for the
trial court to enter an alimony award that is consistent with its substantive alimony
rulings.
Dated this 4th day of October, 2010.
Mohrman & Schofield PC

Michael K. Mohrman
Tracy C. Schofield
Mitchell S. Maio
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Utah R. App. P. Rule 3
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. - An appeal may be taken from a
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of
appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect
the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. — If two or more parties are entitled to appeal
from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they
may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a
single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court
upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. — The party taking the appeal shall be known as the
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall
not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the
appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the
original application shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal -- The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed
from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the
court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. - The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the
filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of
record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such
service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the
certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by that counsel.
35

(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. — At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial
court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall accept a notice of
appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee
within a reasonable time may result in dismissal.
(g) Docketing of appeal — Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the
trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the
date of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid
and whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket.
An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant,
such name shall be added to the title.

Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order
(a) Clerical mistakes. — Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice,
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
— On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
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the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
HISTORY: Amended effective April 1, 1998
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a
motion the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal rule.
The committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules
permitting service by means other than personal service.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2010)
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children - Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time —
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health
insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and
which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the
provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is
covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees,
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties'
separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of
the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the
noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders
for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care,
and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by
modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement,
the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable
attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a
visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred
by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise courtordered visitation or parent-time.
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(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the
payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change
in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall
be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony.
If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
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(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds
that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be
void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a
party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating
with another person.
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